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Improving protection and health monitoring capabilities onboard the electrical power 
system (EPS) for spacecraft is essential for ensuring safe and reliable conditions for deep space 
human exploration.  Electrical protection and control technologies on the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) current human space platform relies 
heavily on ground support to monitor and diagnose power systems and failures.  As 
communication bandwidth diminishes for deep space applications, a transformation in system 
monitoring and control becomes necessary to maintain high reliability of electric power 
service.  This paper presents a novel approach for on-line power system security monitoring 
of autonomous deep space spacecraft. 
Nomenclature 
EPS = Electrical Power System 
DST  = Deep Space Transport 
APC = Autonomous Power Controller 
FDI = Fault Detection and Isolation 
FDIR = Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery 
AI = Artificial Intelligence 
SPRT = Sequential Probability Ratio Test 
MMAE = Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation 
DERs = Distributed Energy Resources 
PMAD = Power Management and Distribution  
TPR = True Positive Rate 
TNR = True Negative Rate 
FPR = False Positive Rate 
FNR = False Negative Rate 
I. Introduction 
ASA is investing heavily in autonomy for deep space vehicles and aeronautics applications.  These autonomous 
power systems have the ability to control and reconfigure a power system for changing conditions such as faults. 
The ability to detect and diagnose faults in complex processes is one of the most important functions of an autonomous 
system.  An example of this type of application is the electrical power system (EPS) of a deep space vehicle, such as 
the deep space transport (DST) which is destined to travel to Mars by the 2030s.  The early observation of incipient 
faults may prevent power system failures, and widespread blackouts that could result in catastrophic damage to other 
subsystems and even risk human lives.  Currently, human rated spacecraft power systems rely on human operators to 
diagnose faults by carefully examining acquired telemetry.  As NASA moves towards deep space exploration, the 
distance from earth at which these spacecraft operate increases greatly.  This distance increases the time it takes to 
receive telemetry from the spacecraft, resulting in longer times to recover and reconfigure after a fault.  Without the 
constant monitoring and analysis from the ground, the EPS is at risk of faults going undetected by circuit breakers or 
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faults persisting in the system in the event of a failure in hardware protection. Therefore on-board failure monitoring 
capabilities for these types of power systems are critical for mission success.   
 This work extends on prior efforts in the development of an autonomous power controller (APC) for deep space 
vehicles.1,2  The APC is responsible for safely operating and protecting the electrical power system, which includes 
managing the energy and power usage by the loads, and fault management.3   This paper will describe some of the 
ongoing development of a fault management system for a deep space exploration spacecraft autonomous power 
controller.   
II. Power-Related Fault Overview  
 DC power systems are susceptible to a variety of fault types that can potentially cause partial or total loss of 
the system loads.  A fault can be defined as an unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property or parameter 
of the system from the acceptable, usual, or standard condition.4  Fault is used as general term that encompasses a 
wide variety of problems that can arise in a power system including failures and malfunctions.  Several efforts in 
power system fault management have focused largely on individual power system components, such as inverters, 
generators, batteries, and relays.  In addition, much of the research has considered only AC systems.  This study will 
consider a DC power system consisting of electronic loads, solar arrays, battery storage, and switching components, 
with current and voltage measurements available throughout.  Some of the fault types may include stuck switches, 
open circuits, solar array and battery faults, and communication failures, amongst others.  Many fault types are able 
to be protected locally using circuit breakers, relays, and other physical protective devices.  Certain events such as 
high impedance short circuits and sensor failures require data from beyond the immediate location of the event to 
diagnose, and therefore must be analyzed using system-wide information.  This paper will provide a method for 
detecting and diagnosing high impedance short circuits and sensor failures on a deep space vehicle power system.       
A. Power System High Impedance Fault 
For the application of a spacecraft DC power system there are several fault types that can cause loss of power to 
the system or physically damage system equipment.  Therefore the protection and control schemes of these types of 
power systems are critically important for mission success.  In general, the most common power system fault is the 
short circuit.  This is commonly addressed using current measuring circuit breakers and reclosers to detect a rapid 
increase in current in order to activate the breaker.  If a short circuit is allowed to persist, power system components 
can be damaged or destroyed due to the high flow of current.  Therefore, it is critical to the safety of the power system 
for the short to be detected and isolated from the rest of the circuit as soon as possible.  This may result in losing the 
ability to power certain loads until the cause of the short is fully isolated.  The best case protection design will be to 
isolate the short circuit while disabling the fewest loads.  In order to do this the power system control must monitor 
for short circuits at all times.    
Short circuits can be categorized into two main types, hard and soft short circuits.  Hard short circuits take place 
when a direct short circuit makes contact to ground.  These faults draw high amounts of current that can cause 
cascading damage if not isolated quickly.  This is largely due to the rapid increase in heat that results from the fault 
current.  According to Gonzalez et. al.5 it is normally desirable to isolate hard shorts in 0.25 to 0.5 seconds, or sooner 
if possible.  Traditionally, local hardware protection is included to handle these types of faults.  These types of circuit 
breakers rely on an internal trip signal that trips nearly instantaneously for hard shorts, and for lower level faults, they 
trip on (i2t) or under voltage.  Thus hard faults, while more common, are relatively easy to detect and isolate. 
Conversely, soft short circuits, commonly referred to as soft faults, can be much more difficult to detect and 
isolate.  In the event of a soft short circuit, there is a resistance between the shorted line and ground, thus limiting the 
fault current.  These types of faults tend to have less damaging effects, however, they can lead to a hard short, so it is 
still important to detect and isolate them quickly.  The level of the fault current is often too low to use normal limit 
checking circuit protection.  The fault current will potentially be indistinguishable from the normal operating current 
causing many false trips in the system or no trip when there is actually a soft fault.  Over tripping would result in poor 
performance of the distribution system in that it may interrupt service to many loads.  Therefore the case of the soft 
short circuit becomes very difficult to diagnose at the local level.  Thus more system information is needed to detect 
and isolate these types of faults.  One solution is to use a central controller to monitor the global system variables, 
using a system model. 
B. Sensor Faults 
 Sensor monitoring and validation is a crucial aspect in determining the fault status of the power system.  Because 
current and voltage sensors are subjected to white Gaussian noise, diagnostic algorithms can become less accurate as 
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the signal to noise ratio increases.  Terrestrial power systems rely on the concept of state estimation to reduce the 
effects of sensor noise and to generate data at locations where sensor readings may not be available.  The Kalman 
filtering method described in section IV can be used to provide optimal state estimates for the noisy power system 
sensors.  Statistical testing can be used to isolate sensor faults, in the event that a sensor becomes biased, excessively 
noisy, or stuck.  These types of sensor failures would go unnoticed or set off false alarms under less sophisticated 
model-free approaches, therefore it is critical to identify these types of faults in the network.    
III. Model-Based Fault Detection, Isolation, and Reconfiguration 
Fault detection isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR) is a critical component of system resiliency, in particular for 
creating more intelligent and autonomous power systems.  FDIR ensures continual safe and acceptable operation of a 
system when a fault occurs.  The performance of a fault diagnostic controller can be characterized by its fault 
sensitivity, reaction speed, and robustness.  Fault sensitivity is the controller’s ability to detect faults of a reasonably 
small size; reaction speed defines the ability of the controller to detect and isolate faults with minimal delay; and 
robustness is the ability of the controller to operate in the presence of noise, and disturbances with few false alarms .6  
These benchmarks offer a quantifiable measure of the performance of the method.  
An important concept of FDIR frequently used is analytical redundancy.  Analytical redundancy can be divided into 
two main categories, qualitative and quantitative.  Intuitively, the quantitative based methods use models derived 
directly from mathematical equations to generate residuals for fault detection and isolation, whereas the qualitative 
based methods rely on other techniques such as artificial intelligence (AI) and pattern recognition to capture 
differences between predicted and actual behavior.   
In general, quantitative model-based methods take place in three steps.  The first step is to generate a set of residuals.  
Using the concept of analytical redundancy, we may define a residual as the difference between a measured output 
and an estimated output, 
 𝑟(𝑡) = 𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑦(𝑡). (1) 
The residuals in a fault detection scheme should satisfy two properties,   
1. Invariance Relation: When no fault occurs, the mean of the residual should be zero. 𝐸[𝑟(𝑡)] = 0 
 
2. Fault Detectability: When any of the faults in the model occur, the residual 𝐸[𝑟(𝑡)] should deviate 
from zero. 
 
Ideally, the residuals should be insensitive to noise, disturbances, and model uncertainties.  Therefore it is important 
for a fault diagnostic controller to generate robust residuals which are insensitive to unwanted corruption, but sensitive 
to only real system faults.   
The second step in model-based fault detection and diagnosis is to make the decision of whether a fault has occurred 
(detection) and the location and type of fault (isolation) based on the residual signature.  There are several existing 
techniques for detection and isolation of faults using the residuals.  The final action is for the controller to perform an 
online reconfiguration in response to any detected fault(s).  Fault detection and diagnostic controllers using model 
based methods include fault detection filters, observer-based methods, parameter estimation methods, and parity 
relation methods to name a few.  
IV. Kalman Filter-Based Approach 
The Kalman filter-based approach uses its innovation sequence to generate residuals for FDI, as introduced by 
Mehra and Peschon7 in 1971.  The decision making process for the Kalman filter is done through statistical testing on 
whiteness, mean, and covariance of the residuals.  The most common tool for these tests is the Maximum Likelihood 
Ratio.  The whiteness and unit variance properties of the Kalman filter residuals allows us to easily validate sensor 
data and diagnose changes in sensor noise, and stuck sensors, which will be demonstrated in Section V.   
An important development in Kalman filter-based FDI is the multiple model adaptive estimation (MMAE) 
approach.8  Here we use a linear stochastic system model with uncertain parameters to represent the faults in the state 
matrices.  With this framework, we can design a Kalman filter for each fault scenario, resulting in a bank of Kalman 
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filters to use for fault detection and isolation.  The MMAE approach has been implemented on several aerospace 
applications including aircraft flight control and internal navigation systems.  An attractive feature of this technique 
is that since the number of fault modes is finite, the control designer can create a fault model corresponding to each 
unique type.  However, as the amount of fault types becomes larger, the computational costs increase as well.  One 
solution to this is to run the fault models in parallel independently.  For certain system failure types, the fault parameter 
changes as the component or subsystem fails.  A realistic approach to this problem is the Interacting Multiple Model 
Approach developed by Zhang and Li.9  In this approach a failure is modeled as a finite Markov chain with known 
transition probabilities.  The algorithm adjusts the Kalman filter parameters based on Gaussian approximations and 
hypothesis merging, otherwise known as “mixing”. 
 
A. Algorithm for Fault Diagnostics 
Expanding upon the work of Wiener10, R.E. Kalman developed a solution to the common filtering and prediction 
problem for dynamic systems.11  We will discuss the Kalman filter algorithm and a few of the statistical properties of 
the Kalman filter’s innovations sequence which will be used for fault diagnosis.  We are able to define the Kaman 
filter algorithm based on Mehra and Peshon’s framework.  First we will consider a discrete-time linear dynamic system 
model.  
 
 𝑥𝑖+1 = 𝜱𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑮𝑖 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜞𝑖𝑤𝑖 (2) 
 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑯𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖 (3) 
Where 
 
 𝑥𝑖 is the 𝑛 × 1 vector of the state variables 
 𝑢𝑖 is the 𝑝 × 1 vector of the control variables 
 𝑤𝑖 is the 𝑞 × 1 vector of random forcing functions 
 𝑧𝑖 is the 𝑟 × 1 vector of the output variables (observables) 
 𝜈𝑖 is the 𝑟 × 1 vector of random measurement errors 
 𝜱𝑖 is the 𝑛 × 𝑛 state transition matrix 
 𝑮𝑖 is the 𝑛 × 𝑝 input distribution matrix 
 𝜞𝑖 is the 𝑛 × 𝑞 noise distribution matrix 
 
Figure 1. Block diagram of the multiple model Kalman filter-based diagnostic algorithm. 
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 𝑯𝑖 is the 𝑟 × 𝑛 output matrix 
 
the subscript 𝑖 denotes the time instant, and characters in bold are matrices.  Note that the random vectors 𝑤𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖 
are Gaussian and white.  This will be useful for statistical testing later on.  Next we may define our innovation sequence 
as: 
 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖/𝑖−1 (4) 
where ?̂?𝑖/𝑖−1 denotes the unbiased minimum variance estimate of 𝑧𝑖 based on the observed measurements up to time 
(i-1).  Using the Kalman filter algorithm, we are able to generate the innovation sequence. 
 ?̅?𝑖+1/𝑖 =  𝜱[?̅?𝑖 + 𝑲𝑖𝑣𝑖] + 𝑮𝑖𝑢𝑖 + 𝜞𝑖?̅?𝑖 (5) 
 𝑥𝑜|−1 = 𝑥0 (6) 
 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖 − 𝑯𝑖 𝑥𝑖/𝑖−1 − ?̅?𝑖 (7) 




 𝑷𝑖+1/𝑖 = 𝜱𝑖𝑷𝑖𝜱𝑖
𝑇 + 𝜞𝑖𝑄𝑖𝜞𝑖
𝑇 (9) 
 𝑷𝑖/𝑖 = (𝐼 − 𝑲𝑖𝑯𝑖)𝑷𝑖/𝑖−1 (10) 
Here 𝑥𝑖/𝑗 is the unbiased minimum variance estimate of 𝑥𝑖 based on observations up to time j. 
 
 𝑲𝒊 is the 𝑛 × 𝑟 Kalman gain matrix 
 𝑷𝒊/𝒊 is the error covariance of  𝑥𝑖/𝑗   
 
In order to test the Kalman Filter algorithm we must ensure that the innovation sequence is white , thus independent at 
different time instants.  To test that our statistical assumptions are true over a sampled distribution, we create a test of 
significance.  Using this test we are able to determine how closely the sample distribution matches our hypothesis.  
Under the null hypothesis the autocorrelation function ck for k = 1, 2, … are asymptotically independent with zero 
mean and covariance I/N, where N is the number of samples.  They can be treated as samples from the same normal 
distribution and must lie within the range of 1.96/√𝑁 more than 95 percent of the time to validate the null 
hypothesis.12  To do this we must test that the sequence is both zero mean and uncorrelated (i.e. zero covariance).  
Below we define how to calculate the standardized innovation sequence as well as the discrete estimates for mean and 
covariance.   












𝑖=1  (12) 
where N is the number of samples, and 𝜂̅ is the true mean of the innovation sequence.  To test this under the null 
hypothesis, 𝜂̅ has a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and covariance.  Thus 95 percent of the time we expect  
 |𝜂̅̂| > 1.96 𝐼/√𝑁 (13) 
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for the null hypothesis to hold true.  Secondly, we must show that the innovation sequence is uncorrelated (i.e. 








Using the Kalman filter-based fault diagnosis method, the application of power system faults for space vehicles is 
examined.           
V. Implementation and Simulation Results 
The main objective of this study is to develop a model-based FDI algorithm, capable of detecting and isolating faults 
at the central level of the APC.  The data used to test the fault management scheme was created in 
MATLAB®/Simulink® (the Math Works, Inc.) by PC Krause and Associates to model a simplified version of the 
DSG using models of NASA’s Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) power electronics.  We will test the 
feasibility of the controller by its ability to correctly detect and isolate a variety of power system fault scenarios.  The 
test network is shown below in Figure 2. The configuration includes generation from solar arrays with dc regulators 
(SA 1, 2) and battery storage units which also have charge and discharge regulation (BATT 1, 2).  In the middle of 
the network there are main bus switching units (Bus 3 and 7), and further downstream (to the right) are power 
distribution units (Bus 4 and 8), responsible for providing energy to the constant power loads.  
To model the power distribution system we use develop connectivity matrix using DC nodal analysis.  In this 
scheme, our state vector x consists of all the bus voltages in the network.  To populate the current measurements in 
this matrix for any power system, two rules apply:  
 Diagonal Elements: 𝑌𝑘𝑘 =  𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑠 𝑘  (15) 
 Off-diagonal Elements: 𝑌𝑘𝑛 = −(𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑢𝑠 𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛) (16) 
 
Where Ykn is the admittance of the line between bus k and n.  The connectivity matrix can be used to relate bus voltages 
and line currents everywhere in the power system.  Naturally, this will be a useful tool to model different types of 








𝑌13 0 −𝑌13 0
0 𝑌23 −𝑌23 0
−𝑌13 −𝑌23 𝑌13 + 𝑌23 + 𝑌34 −𝑌34








Figure 2. One-line diagram of the test power system. 
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We can expand on this framework to include current for each switch in the network, output voltages for solar array 
and battery busses, as well as input and output voltages for Bus 3, 4, 7, and 8 switches.  In addition, we can remove 
row 6 above because it represents the net current injected into Bus3, which is always equal to zero because it is a 
distribution bus.  Using these equations we can create a model for the observed currents and voltages in the normal 
operating power system of Figure 2. 
In order to model a short circuit on one of the lines we can manipulate the connectivity matrix to account for 
current leakage on one of the lines.  Using this methodology we are able to model a short circuit of any resistance 
regardless of the power output level.  Sensor faults are also able to be isolated using the standardized innovation 
sequence of the Kalman filter.  Sensor fault isolation will be discussed in greater detail below. 
A. Simulation Results 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the fault management design, we will run the simulation over several 
hundreds of test cases with varying fault parameters.  We will run 100 cases for each fault type as well as well as 100 
cases with no faults.  Our fault types will include faults that require diagnosis at the central level, which include high 
impedance faults on all of the distribution lines and sensor biases on all of the network sensors (Vout, Vin, I).  For each 
fault case we vary the load level, eclipse state, and fault parameter.  Fault parameters are sensor offset value, and short 
to ground impedance.  An example of the controller running in the normal mode is displayed below in Figure 3.   
During the normal mode operation we can see that our Kalman filter gives us an optimal estimate (red) for the 
observed noisy sensor data (black), thus giving us a more trustworthy representation of the data to analyze.  For 
spacecraft that may be in flight for several decades, the signal to noise ratio is liable to increase, therefore making 
optimal state estimation an important part of power system health monitoring.  Our residuals are calculated by the 
innovation sequence of our normal mode filter, which consists of the difference between the observed data and the 
estimated data.  The fault diagnostic algorithm runs the tests for whiteness, mean, and covariance to diagnose faults 
in the system. 
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When a fault in the system occurs, the residual sequence of the normal model fails one or more of the statistical 
tests, and the fault models are launched in parallel.  If one of the fault model filters is able to pass the tests for whiteness, 
mean, and covariance, then the controller is able to successfully isolate the type of fault.  The example in Figure  4 
shows a high impedance fault on the line in between Bus 2 and Bus 3.  The current leakage to ground breaks the 
normal model filter, and the fault models are subsequently launched.  The controller is able to correctly identify the 
fault as a high impedance short on the correct line, by matching the model with the particular fault to the incoming 
residual window.  Using all of the state estimates of the power system, we are able to confidently isolate the fault, and 
prevent false alarms by minimizing noise and relying on multiple system variables to make the diagnosis.   
 
Another test we will demonstrate is a sensor offset.  In this scenario, a sensor may deviate from its true value, 
which may cause problems in the analysis of other power system algorithms.  Therefore it is critical to isolate a sensor 
fault from a fault in the hardware.  Figure 5 shows the normal model estimates for a biased sensor on an input voltage 
to Bus5 (RBI2-1_Vout).  Again the residual sequence of the controller in the normal mode fails the statistical tests 
described above.  Then the code determines the sensor with the largest residual and autonomously generates a filter 
model with the suspected sensor removed.  Finally, the controller is able to isolate the sensor fault by matching the 
data to the new sensor fault filter.  This general process is common for performing power system state estimation and 
sensor validation on terrestrial power systems.  One advantage of the Kalman filter approach is that the controller 
analyses the residuals over a window of time and determines the result based on the mean of the innovation sequence.  
This means that this method will be more robust in the face of transients and occasional out-of-sync data.  More basic 
techniques only rely on instantaneous data, which can lead to problems in the event of data mismatches, disturbances, 
and transients.       
The main challenge in isolating a large number of fault types with limited data observability is differentiating 
between indistinguishable fault types.  In this case the output data for some of the high impedance  short circuits looks 
 
Figure 4. High impedance short to ground fault between Bus2 and Bus3 
 
 
Figure 5. Sensor offset on a Bus7 voltage sensor. 
Time (ms) 
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identical to a current sensor offset.  One potential solution to this may be the addition of power system testing.  In 
such a situation, a set of certain allowable actions may be taken (such as opening a switch or turning off a device) in 
order to collect additional data and isolate the fault type.  This is an area for future work in this field known as active 
fault diagnosis. 
To summarize the results thus far, a confusion matrix has been developed to determine at what rate the controller 
was able to correctly diagnose the inserted fault.  2,800 fault and non-fault scenarios were generated in total for this 
study.  The classification results for all of the faults inserted on one string of the power system can be seen in Table II 
of Appendix A.  When a fault was inserted in the simulation, the condition is considered positive.  If the controller 
was able to correctly diagnose the fault, then the predicted condition is also found to be positive.  For a non-faulted 
simulation, the condition is negative; likewise when no fault is found by the controller the predicted condition is 
negative.  The confusion matrix consists of four elements, True Positive Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate (TNR), False 
Positive Rate (FPR), and False Negative Rate (FNR).  They are calculated by the following equations with results 
presented in Table I. 
 
 𝑇𝑃𝑅 =  
∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
 (18) 
 𝑇𝑁𝑅 =  
∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
 (19) 
 𝐹𝑃𝑅 =  
∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
 (20) 
 𝐹𝑁𝑅 =





Autonomous power systems must have the ability to detect, isolate, and recover from power system failures.  This 
paper proposed using a Kalman filter approach to perform fault management to detect short circuits and sensors failure 
within a space DC microgrid.  By analyzing a sequence of time series residuals we are able to isolate faults (such as a 
stuck sensor) that less robust model-free methods cannot.  In addition, residual sequence analysis gives our FDI 
method improved robustness in the face of transients and other disturbances, unlike simpler methods.  The  challenge 
of isolating high impedance short circuits as well as various sensor failures was identified for space power applications, 
and therefore was a suitable first candidate for our FDI technique.  Lastly, we show the simulation results for a small 
DC system with simulated PMAD components.  Overall the method was shown to be successful in detecting and 
isolating high and low impedance short circuits and sensor failures.  
Table I. Confusion Matrix for DC Power System Faults 
 Predicted Condition 
True Condition TPR: 87%  FPR: 1%  
FNR: 1.89% TNR: 99% 
 
10 




The authors would like to thank Advanced Exploration Systems Project, AES Chief Technologist James 
Soeder, AMPS Project Manager Karin Bozak, Long Truong, Yu Hin (Billy) Hau, PC Krause and Associates, and 
Dr. Kenneth Loparo for their support in this work. 
References 
1 May, R.D., et. al. “An Architecture to Enable Autonomous Control of Spacecraft,” AIAA-2014-3834, AIAA Propulsion and 
Energy Forum, 12th International Energy Conversion Engineering Conference, Cleveland, OH, July 28-30, 2014. 
2 Dever, T.P., Trase, L.M., Soeder, J.F., “Application of Autonomous Spacecraft Power Control Technology to Terrestrial 
Microgrids,” AIAA-2014-3836, AIAA Propulsion and Energy Forum, 12th International Energy Conversion Engineering 
Conference, Cleveland, OH, July 28-30, 2014. 
Table II. Classification Results for a Single String of Simulation Faults   
 Predicted Condition 
 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8 f9 f10 f11 f12 f13 f14 f15 
True 
Condition  
f1 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f2 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f3 0 0 98 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f4 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f5 0 1 0 8 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 
f6 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f7 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f8 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 98 0 0 0 0 0 
f11 0 1 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 
f1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 
f13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 
f14 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 0 
f15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 91 
 
Table III. Fault Descriptions for Simulation Testing   
Fault Name Description  
f1 Bus6-Bus7 High Impedance Short-to-Ground 
f2 BCDU2 Vout Sensor Offset 
f3 Bus7-Bus8 High Impedance Short-to-Ground 
f4 No Fault 
f5 RBI2-1 I Sensor Offset 
f6 RBI2-1 Vin Sensor Offset 
f7 RBI2-1 Vout Sensor Offset 
f8 RBI2-2 I Sensor Offset 
f9 RBI2-2 Vin Sensor Offset 
f10 RBI2-2 Vout Sensor Offset 
f11 RBI2-4 I Sensor Offset 
f12 RBI2-4 Vin Sensor Offset 
f13 RBI2-4 Vout Sensor Offset 
f14 Bus5-Bus7 High Impedance Short-to-Ground 




American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
3 Csank, J.T., et. al. “An Autonomous Power Controller for the NASA Human Deep Space Gateway,” AIAA-2014-3834, AIAA 
Propulsion and Energy Forum, to be presented at the AIAA Propulsion and Energy Forum and Exposition, Cincinnati, OH, July 
9-11, 2018. 
4 Hwang, I., Kim S., Kim Y., and Seah, C. E., “A Survey of Fault Detection, Isolation, and Reconfiguration Methods ,” IEEE 
Transactions on Control Systems Technology, Vol. 18, 2010, pp. 636-653. 
5 Gonzalez, A. J., et. al. “Model-Based, Real-Time Control of Electrical Power Systems,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, and 
Cybernetics, Vol. 26. 1996, pp. 470-482. 
6 Gertler, J., Fault Detection and Diagnosis in Engineering Systems. Vol. 1, New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1998. 
7 Mehra, R. K., and Peschon J., “An Innovations Approach to Fault Detection and Diagnosis in Dynamic Systems,” Automatica, 
Vol. 4, 1971, pp. 637-640.  
8 Magill, D. T., “Optimal Adaptive Estimation of Sampled Stochastic Processes,”  IEEE Trans. Aut. Control, Vol. 10. 1965, pp. 
434-439.  
9 Zhang Y. M., and Li, X. R., “Detection and Diagnosis of Sensor and Actuator Failures Using IMM Estimator,”  IEEE 
Transactions on Aerospace and Electrical Systems, Vol. 34, 1998, pp. 1293-1313. 
10 Wiener, N., The Extrapolation, Interpolation and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 
N.Y. 1949. 
11 Kalman, R. E., “A New Approach to Linear Filtering and Prediction Problems,” Transactions of the ASME-Journal of Basic 
Engineering, Vol. 82, 1960, pp. 35-45. 
12 Jenkins, Gwilym, and Watts D., Spectral Analysis and Its Applications, Holden-Day Inc., San Francisco, 1968. 
13 Ricks, B., W., Mengshoel, O. J., “Methods for Probabilistic Fault Diagnosis: An Electrical Power System Case Study,” Annual 
Conference of the Prognostics and Health Management Society, 2009, San Diego, CA.  
 
